TransLink’s 2013 Fare Increase

Transport Action BC has responded to TransLink’s request for a major fare increase in 2013. The following issues were submitted to the TransLink Commissioner for his consideration as part of his review of TransLink’s request.

Our concerns are with the timing of the fare increase and about transit service and ancillary operations. We feel these issues should be addressed as part of the fare review process. We are not, a priori, against fare increases, as long as they are justifiable to maintain and improve service on a system that is already efficiently run.

  1. Timing:

The 2013 fare increase, if approved, would be implemented just prior to the Compass smart card fare system. Item 15 of the Fares Questions and Answers (Q&A) on the TransLink Commissioner’s web site states TransLink plans significant changes to existing fare media with the Compass card implementation, although no details are presented.

This begs the question of why is TransLink proceeding with the 2013 fare increase when its implementation period may be less than a year? There are costs to implementing a fare increase and similar work will be required as part of the Compass card implementation. This could lead to TransLink being questioned on the efficacy of two fare changes in a short time period. From an outsider’s perspective, it would be seem sensible to bundle all fare changes into the Compass roll-out, eliminating one set of fare change costs and reducing public annoyance over back-to-back fare changes, including a significant fare increase.

    2. Transit Service Operations:

TransLink states (Item 4, Q&A), a fare increase is needed to continue existing service levels and maintain the transit system in a state of good repair. However, TransLink should justify that the transit system is currently operating as efficiently as feasible.

 Transit system users will notice that TransLink’s vehicles spend large amounts of time parked at route terminals or waiting at timing points along a route. Anecdotal observation suggests this unproductive time is excessive. Examples are short headway routes where 2 – 4 vehicles may be observed at a terminal or twenty minute headway services where a following vehicle arrives at the terminal before the preceding vehicle has left. Layovers may be necessary for service recovery and shoulder period schedule adjustments. They should not be used as a scheduling convenience or de facto method of providing Operator breaks to avoid the rigours of contractual negotiations with the Canadian Autoworkers Union, WorkSafe BC and / or the Ministry of Labour.

By way of comparison, the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) allows its Operators to arrive at terminals 2 minutes before the vehicle’s scheduled departure time. Operator breaks are provided as part of the Operator’s schedule, not the vehicle’s schedule. This keeps vehicles moving and picking up passengers.

A transit vehicle is an investment of several hundred thousand dollars. To have such an investment sitting idle for a significant portion of its working day (up to 20 minutes per trip in some cases) is not an efficient use of an expensive resource.

Additionally, as more frequent services are introduced, do lengthy layover times lead to unnecessary vehicle purchases to provide that service? Excessive vehicle requirements increase space needs for terminal layover space and garage and maintenance facilities. Optimising schedules to minimise lengthy layovers could result in capital and operating cost savings through reduced vehicle needs.

TransLink should state that unproductive schedule time is minimised and schedules are optimised for service efficiency and cost effectiveness. This would support its case that the fare increase is needed to maintain the current system in a state of good repair and ensure service expansion is effectively implemented.

Routing inefficiencies in the system should also be validated and justified by TransLink. There are deviations from grid routing that may have been necessary at one time but should be re-evaluated in terms of ridership served, overall route ridership, and impact on route mileage and service hours to ensure they are still viable.

To its credit, TransLink has initiated the Service Optimization project which has led to service adjustments by re-allocating resources from some lightly used services to areas of overcrowding. This initiative is laudable and should be a permanent part of TransLink’s service operations design. However, the optimizing process and analysis should be more transparent to the public and politicians in order to rigorously support changes, particularly service reductions.

A rigorous, robust and transparent service operations design process enables TransLink to resist political expediency in allocating its limited service resources. The South of Fraser area has received significant increases in transit service, possibly due to political pressure resulting from claims that Surrey residents “pay” much more to TransLink than they receive in service. Future increases to transit service, anywhere in TransLink’s service region, must be based on clear evidence that that is the best use of those resources, not the politically convenient one. Any deviation from this policy must have clear lines of responsibility and accountability published.

Once service is established, TransLink and its subsidiaries should ensure that full use of available technology is made to monitor and regulate service. TransLink has a GPS-based AVL which monitors vehicle location and schedule adherence and allows two-way communication between Operators and a central control facility. TransLink should assure the public that the AVL is being effectively used to ensure transit service is operating as close to schedule as feasible. Controllers should be responding to transit service disruptions (delays, off schedule, surge loads, collisions, etc.) by proactively re-routing service, short-turning vehicles and otherwise adjusting the transit system to minimise passenger inconvenience.    

   3. Ancillary Operations:

 The roles and responsibilities of the Transit Police and Coast Mountain Bus Company (CMBC) Transit Security group should be reviewed and clarified to minimise overlap, maximise co-operation and ensure that each group is truly necessary and making effective use of its resources. We have several questions on this topic.  

1. Is it necessary to have two separate organisations, within TransLink, doing the same function – essentially checking fares?
2. Are large, police-special Dodge Chargers an appropriate vehicle for the CMBC Security Group?
3. The Transit Police seems to have defaulted to being the SkyTrain Police. What is its role vis-à-vis the rest of TransLink’s facilities and service region?
4. Can the public should be assured that the Transit Police are principally engaged in transit-related duties and not acting as a quasi-regional force dealing with matters more appropriately dealt with and funded by municipal forces?
5. Where do SkyTrain and Canada Line Attendants fit into the security matrix?

 None of these queries should be construed as stating TransLink’s security services are unnecessary, ineffective or wasteful. What is needed is clarity to and visibility around their functions, effectiveness, funding, and resource utilisation.  

   4. Concluding Remarks:

 We believe the above discussion items are valid issues relevant to the four considerations the TransLink Commission will weigh when analyzing TransLink’s proposed 2013 fare increase:  

1. Maintain TransLink’s financial stability.
2. Allow TransLink to provide planned service.
3. Encourage TransLink to minimise expenses.
4. Keep fares as low as possible.

 TransLink will have a more effective and supportable rationale for its proposed fare increase, if it publicly addresses our stated concerns. Openness and transparency can only assist TransLink make its case on a sensitive issue such as a fare increase. Formal public presentations and hearings should be considered.

Transit Rider “Pass-ups” in Vancouver

The Vancouver Sun analyzed transit passenger “pass-up” data provided by Coast Mountain Bus Company (CMBC – TransLink’s main bus service Operator). The newspaper found four routes where “pass-ups” occur much more frequently than all other routes – 22 Knight-MacDonald, north and south of the Burrard Bridge; 25 Brentwood Stn-UBC along much of the route; 49 Metrotown-UBC between Victoria Drive and Cambie Street ; and 99 Broadway Stn-UBC at several main intersections.

Several CMBC managers and the Canadian Auto Workers (Operators’ union) president provide insight into the “pass-up” problem and reasons why it is difficult to address.  A fixed service hours budget and limited depot space preclude simply adding more buses. Replacing 40’ buses with articulated ones requires changes to stop lengths and rebuilding loops with tight turning radii. Apparently, CMBC ‘encourages’ its Operators to maintain consistent vehicle spacing between buses but headway consistency is a route supervision (i.e. management) issue. Operators have enough to concern them without having to wonder how far their bus is from the one ahead.

The ultimate solution, according to TransLink, is the “Compass” smart card that will be implemented in 2013. This will allow TransLink to offer different fares at different times of the day. Higher fares in the peak periods could encourage some customers to shift their travel times, potentially providing some relief on overcrowded routes.

However, the article doesn’t question if CMBC is making the most efficient use of TransLink’s buses. Regular transit users know that Vancouver’s buses spend much time at terminals and certain intersections not moving.

                                   

There are valid reasons for idle time; it allows vehicles to get back on schedule and provides Operator breaks. But, given overcrowding problems, is so much slack time the most effective way to solve these issues? Are there other ways to keep buses on schedule and provide Operator breaks but keep buses moving and picking up customers? Experience elsewhere suggests there is.

The Toronto Transit Commission (TTC), for example, allows Operators to arrive at terminals, a mere two minutes before their scheduled departure time. It still manages to run an effective service (one of the highest fare box recovery ratios in North America) and provide Operator breaks. It does this using on-street Route Supervisors and electronic vehicle tracking. Service adjustments are made ‘on the fly’ to meet customer demand and return vehicles to schedule. Operator breaks are provided as part of the Operator’s schedule and not the vehicle’s schedule, thereby keeping vehicles in service and picking up passengers. The TTC also implements schedule changes much more frequently than most transit systems (8-10 times / year vs. 4 times / year). This allows it to be much more responsive to changes in passenger loads by re-assigning service from lower performing routes (and route segments) to those with crowding issues.

Closer to home, a Seattle transit system audit estimated savings of up to $23,000,000 by tightening bus schedules. Vancouver may not be directly comparable to Seattle but this is an order of magnitude estimate of potential savings that could be used to revamp bus schedules to alleviate the “pass-up” problem.

There may be contractual, operational and political issues that prevent CMBC from overhauling its bus schedules and operational procedures but shouldn’t TransLink and CMBC assure taxpayers that they are using the current bus fleet most efficiently?

Canada Line P3 “Get Out of Jail Free” Card?

Transport Action BC members raised concerns about Canada Line service incidents that seriously affected its passengers, with no publicised action taken against the line’s private sector operator (InTransit BC / Protrans BC) by TransLink.

The Canada Line is, possibly, the most vigorously debated of the provincial government’s Public-Private Partnerships (P3) projects. Under the P3 model, a private sector concessionaire may finance, design build, and /or operate a specific project and assumes some project risk, in return for a guaranteed investment return. However, the concessionaire contracts to provide a certain level of service.  Penalties should be considered by the project’s owner (in this case TransLink), if contractual obligations are not met. Essentially, the concessionaire does a detailed risk-analysis and decides how best to do the project while minimising its costs,  maximising its returns and avoiding penalty payments.

There are two incidents that concerned Transport Action BC. Both incidents resulted in significant and lengthy disruptions to Canada Line passengers.

Canada Line train at Templeton Station

The first was the morning-long shutdown of the line on 26 November 2010 due to snow and ice build-up on the line’s 3^rd rail. Transport Action BC felt that the Canada Line operator should have been able to handle a snow storm that, while uncommon, can reasonably be expected in a Vancouver winter. The fact that TransLink’s SkyTrain lines successfully operated under similar conditions shows that it could be done. Our concern was that the concessionaire had underestimated weather-related risks in the design of Canada Line elevated structures and inclement weather operating procedures. Under our understanding of a P3 scenario, this should have resulted in a penalty to the concessionaire.

The second incident was a series of late-night, service reductions to Canada Line service for track maintenance in February, March and April. Customers had to deal with reduced rapid transit service, shuttle trains or use the parallel bus route (albeit with more frequent service). This level of maintenance was a concern because the line was barely 1 ½ years old. Was there some underlying design flaw that resulted from the concessionaire’s risk analysis?

Transport Action BC sent letters to the TransLink Board of Directors after each of these incidents and received responses each time.

The first response indicated that the November 2010 shutdown was part of the two-year “learning curve” for the new transit project and penalties were not justified.

In addition to the track maintenance issue, our second letter questioned the rationale for a “learning curve” on a P3 contract. We felt that the concessionaire had made design decisions based on its risk-analysis. It should be responsible for those decisions and held accountable for any significant passenger impacts.

TransLink’s response to this letter stated its contract with InTransit BC / Protrans BC included a moratorium on performance penalties for the first two years (until 2011 August 12). This was a revelation to Transport Action BC and, we suspect, most members of the public are unaware that such a loophole exists in the Canada Line contract.

There are several concerns with this. What is the reason for this contract concession? It certainly violates the spirit of the P3 mantra as presented by P3 supporters. Do other P3 contracts include similar conditions? And, most importantly, how would the customers affected by Canada Line service failures feel if they were told that, other than some bad publicity, the line’s operator was not penalised for its failings?

Inside a Canada Line train on opening day Aug 2009

Transit planning in BC

BC Transit is embarking on a number of transit studies for communities outside of Vancouver, such as Victoria, Abbotsford and Fraser Valley communities, Kelowna, and Kamloops. Transit Future as BC Transit calls it, asks for public input for these different regions.

More specifically, on the Abbotsford & Mission service area of BC Transit, the City of Abbotsford, and the City of Mission have embarked on a 25 year transit strategy. This strategy is based on the Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure’s Fraser Valley Transit Study released in December 2010.

Many of the initiatives involved in this report such as creating a transit connection between Chilliwack and Abbotsford, the important link between Abbotsford into Langley is not being discussed at all. While presently you can take the 21 Aldergrove Connection and link to the 502 Aldergrove/Surrey Central Station service, it is ignoring a serious issue. People in Abbotsford cannot effectively access employment in Langley Township, Langley City, and Surrey unless they use a car.

Thanks to Ken Wuschke for developing this post. For more information see his Transportation Choices blog.

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